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Jim Gough directs his attention to an investigation of opinion as something identifiably 
distinct from argumentation.  Examining opinion in its own right, as something separate from 
argumentation, seems to me to be a useful endeavor.  So I will offer what I hope are some 
helpful observations on this project.  
First of all, I think it would be useful to distinguish between two uses of the word: Aopinion.@  
Suppose you were to turn to your spouse, the love of your life, or your best beloved, or however 
you choose to designate the object of your affections, and suppose you were to look deep into 
their almond brown eyes and say AI love you.@   And suppose they were to murmur back: AI hope 
you believe that.@  And you were to add: AWell, it=s just an opinion.@  I don=t think they would be 
impressed. 
The problem is that the word Aopinion@ can be used in at least two different senses. AMere 
opinion@ is unsubstantiated, highly tentative or uncritical belief.  It is suspicious belief, belief that 
cannot be backed up by firm evidence, belief that is irreparably uncertain.  On the other hand, we 
might use the word Aopinion@ to denote the belief-set, the world-view of any particular individual 
person.  In this latter sense, everyone has opinions.  Socrates had opinions.  Hegel had opinions.  
Yes, even the skeptics had opinions. 
Because informal logic is essentially evaluative—the goal is to differentiate between good 
and bad arguments—students of the discipline often use the word Aopinion@ in the former, 
pejorative sense.  Faced with a conspicuously bad example of reasoning, the Principle of Charity 
directs us to identify a passage as a mere opinion and forgo serious analysis.  Opinion, in this 
sense, becomes a garbage bin into which egregiously bad arguments go.  I agree with Jim Gough 
that the usual negative classification of opinions as arguments that did not quite make the grade 
is over-simple and even misguided.  I suspect that Gough=s dissatisfaction with this elemental 
scheme is the main driving force behind his paper.   
I have two main questions.  First, Gough seems to classify opinion as a form of performative 
discourse.  J. L. Austin identifies performative discourse as discourse that brings into existence 
the reality it reports.  If I say, AI promise to pay you five hundred dollars next Tuesday,@ the mere 
fact that I say this is what makes the promise real.  If my promise-intention is never expressed in 
language (written or spoken), no promise ever took place.  So performative discourse both 
reports a reality and somehow constitutes that very same reality.  But does this hold true for 
arguments?  Suppose I never express my opinion of you in language.  Is that still an opinion?  
Are opinions necessarily linguistic?  
If I run from a rabid dog that is frothing at the mouth, do I express an opinion?  The mere 
fact that I run away demonstrates that I hold a certain belief.  I believe that this is a dangerous 
dog.  In my opinion, this is a dangerous dog.  But is this unexpressed belief an opinion? 
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There are circumstances in which verbal articulation of a belief may be ill-advised.  I may 
have definitive convictions in things I am silent about.  To speak of opinion as a form of 
performative discourse seems to suggest that opinions only come into existence when we 
actually express them.  It is when we fit them into words that opinions begin to be.  But is this 
the case?  It is the expression of an opinion that makes it an opinion.  I think this is a worthwhile 
question. 
One could pursue this line of inquiry further.  Opinions do seem to be linguistic in that they 
are inescapably propositional.  If I say my opinion is ACalgary,@ or Ared@ or Araining@ that does 
not make any sense.  I need to say that ACalgary is the most beautiful city in Canada,@ or that Athe 
wallpaper is red,@ or that Ait is raining outside.@  Opinions, in this sense, need to be expressed as 
complete units of thought.   This leaves open the question of whether opinions exist before or 
independently of their expression as propositions. 
I would also ask Jim for clarification on a second point.  Are opinions psychological or 
epistemological, or perhaps both.  If I report a feeling I am having is that report an opinion?  If I 
say, AI am sad,@ or if I say, pointing at my cut finger, AThat hurts,@ am I expressing an opinion?  I 
would have thought that opinions have to do with belief more than feeling.  I believe that the 
world is round.  In my opinion, it is round.  But I know my finger hurts.  It is not merely my 
opinion that it hurts.  This seems to be too weak of a formulation. 
Opinion involves a pretense, a claim to knowledge.  This is why people argue about 
opinions.  One can=t have an argument without an opinion.  It is not merely, as Jim observes, that 
the conclusion of an argument is an opinion.  The premises of an argument are opinions as well.  
They involve claims to knowledge.  So opinionation and argumentation are not mutually-distinct 
endeavors.  In both cases we have a claim to knowledge that is or is not supported.  But this 
seems to suggest that opinions are epistemological and that they involve more than matters of 
simple taste or personal preference.  
Gough writes: AIt cannot...be presumed that argumentation is necessarily always better than 
opinionation.@  In modern discourse, philosophy tens to be associated with argument.  But the 
traditional goal of philosophy is some kind of wisdom.  On this more ancient view, the point of 
say philosophy is not to have the right arguments but the right opinions.  Opinion is more 
important than argument in that argument is only as a means, a conduit to true belief.  Someone 
who has true opinions (in the second, non-pejorative sense of that term) has accomplished the 
goal of philosophy.  
Definitely, we can evaluate opinions.   Gough himself suggests that there are good and bad 
opinions.  But I would suggest that another distinction might be necessary.  Opinions may be 
Agood@ because of their substantive content, or they may be Agood@ because they adequately 
express what the subject truly believes.  So we can invoke a substantive or procedural account of 
opinion evaluation. The racist may adequately express his racist world-view, but this is still—in 
a moral sense—a bad opinion because it has the wrong content.  Perhaps argumentation is a tool 
that can be used to investigate and evaluate opinion in both substantive and procedural sense.  
As a philosopher, it is humbling to think that ordinary people often come to the right or the 
true belief without argument.  Consider the person who makes the right moral decision without 










Several years ago, there was a South African expedition to Mt. Everest that was racked by 
political troubles. The reporters assigned to the expedition were told to leave and then forced to 
return.  When they arrived back at camp, the Sherpa cook was instructed to ignore them 
completely and to offer them no assistance whatsoever.  The response of the Sherpa was a terse 
ABullshit@ as he proceeded to serve the unwelcome guests hot tea and biscuits.  Note that the 
Sherpa did not argue the point.  He did engage in dialogue, in logical moves intended to 
undermine the credibility of his superiors.  Yet the Sherpa had a definite opinion about the 
political dissension in the camp.  Surely, in such an inhospitable environment, it was the right 
opinion, the moral opinion.  Argument, in such circumstances, seems beside the point. 
